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Abstract
In last years, there has been an increasing effort to leverage Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT), including blockchain. One of the main topics of
interest, given its importance, is the research and development of privacy
mechanisms, as for example is the case of Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP).
ZKP is a cryptographic technique that can be used to hide information
that is put into the ledger, while still allowing to perform validation of
this data.
In this work we describe different strategies to construct Zero Knowl-
edge Range Proofs (ZKRP), as for example the scheme proposed by
Boudot [9] in 2001; the one proposed in 2008 by Camenisch et al [11],
and Bulletproofs [10], proposed in 2017. We also compare these strategies
and discuss possible use cases.
Since Bulletproofs [10] is the most efficient construction, we will give
a detailed description of its algorithms and optimizations. Bulletproofs is
not only more efficient than previous schemes, but also avoids the trusted
setup, which is a requirement that is not desirable in the context of Dis-
tributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and blockchain. In case of cryptocur-
rencies, if the setup phase is compromised, it would be possible to generate
money out of thin air. Interestingly, Bulletproofs can also be used to con-
struct generic Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP), in the sense that it can be
used to prove generic statements, and thus it is not only restricted to
ZKRP, but it can be used for any kind of Proof of Knowledge (PoK).
Hence Bulletproofs leads to a more powerful tool to provide privacy for
DLT. Here we describe in detail the algorithms involved in Bulletproofs
protocol for ZKRP. Also, we present our implementation, which was open
sourced [41].
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1 Introduction
DLT and blockchain have been subject to intense research in last years, because
it allows to construct consensus among parties that do not fully trust each
other, without the necessity of a trusted third party. However, in public and
permissionless ledgers, transactions can be viewed by everyone in the network.
This fact is a hindrance that we must overcome if those transactions contain
privacy-sensitive information.
In order to protect private information, a possible alternative is to use a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), like Intel SGX [32] technology. The
idea is that any private data must appear in the blockchain in encrypted form.
Only the owners of the subjacent cryptographic keys will be able to decrypt
it. Validation of this information must be done in the TEE system, where the
cryptographic keys can be embedded. Therefore, private data will only be vis-
ible after decryption, which occurs inside a controlled environment. Putting
differently, a TEE offers protection against information leakage by restricting
manipulation of private data to a region of memory that can not be accessed by
other processes in the same machine, or even by its administrator. Nevertheless,
attacks [19, 51] to SGX where proposed in literature, showing that this technol-
ogy is vulnerable to branch prediction and side-channel attacks, respectively.
A different approach to secure private data is ZKP, which is a cryptographic
technique that have been used to provide privacy by design in the context of
DLT and blockchain. Shortly, ZKP allows an entity called prover to argue
to another party, called verifier, that a determined statement is true without
revealing more information than strictly necessary to convince her.
In previous works [52, 40] ING described some preliminary results. The
purpose of this work is to extend them in order to provide a complete survey
on ZKRP protocols.
In summary, ZKRP allows to prove that a secret integer belongs to a certain
interval. For example, if we define this interval to be all integers between 18 and
200, a person can use the ZKRP scheme to prove that she is over 18. This gives
her permission, according to some regulation, to consume a determined service,
but without revealing her specific age. In the context of payment systems, if
party A wants to transfer money to party B, then it is possible to utilize ZKRP
to prove that the amount of money in the transaction is positive, otherwise, if
the amount is negative, such transaction would in fact transfer money in the
opposite direction, i.e. from B to A. A limitation of ZKRP is, however, that
it can be used for numeric intervals only, and it is not possible to use a generic
set.
In this document we will describe some strategies to achieve ZKRP. In par-
ticular, we will describe the construction by Camenisch et al [11], which allows
to construct Zero Knowledge Set Membership (ZKSM). With ZKSM we can de-
fine generic sets and still maintain privacy requirements. ZKSM is very similar
to ZKRP, the difference is that instead of the numeric interval used in ZKRP, we
have a generic set in ZKSM. In other words, imagine that the set is formed by
all countries in the European Union. Hence, if the private information is given
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by a country name, for instance the country of residence of a particular user,
then she can use ZKSM to generate a zero knowledge proof that the private
data is indeed an element from this set, therefore proving that she lives in the
EU. This kind of cryptographic building block is interesting for any situation
that includes sets and includes a strong privacy component. More concretely,
next we describe possible use cases for ZKRP and ZKSM.
In the following sections we describe in detail the algorithms necessary to
implement ZKRP and instantiate the underlying parameters in order to obtain
an appropriate level of security. We also compare the different schemes with
regards to proof size, and the complexity of the prover and verifier algorithms.
1.1 Contributions
There are many surveys about zero knowledge proofs, but mostly related to the
theoretical foundations of the proposed cryptographic constructions. The main
goal of this survey is to bridge the gap between those papers whose audience is
the cryptographic community and the community of developers that are more
focused on implementation aspects. In 2018 there was the first Zero Knowledge
Proofs Standardization Workshop [17], where academy and industry started the
effort to produce a standard to implement ZKPs. The workshop was divided
into three categories: security, implementation and application. The first one
was responsible for establishing the subjacent theoretical basis to instantiate
ZKPs, determining security models and underlying assumptions. The second
one was responsible to propose APIs, software architecture and best practices
for ZKPs. Lastly, the third one was responsible for determining interesting
use cases for ZKPs, finding high level requirements to the other categories. In
particular, some ZK gadgets were identified as important building blocks for the
construction of solutions to more complex problems. Among the ZK gadgets
that were discussed, we can remark ZK Range Proofs, ZK Set Membership and
cryptographic accumulators. These gadgets can be commonly used to solve
different practical problems, as pointed out in last section.
Next we summarize the main contributions of this work:
• Survey possible use cases for ZKRP and other similar ZKPs. We indicate
which papers in the literature present important contributions for the
construction of efficient solutions to this use cases.
• Describe in detail the algorithms required for each different strategy to
implement ZKRP. In particular, we describe how the Fiat-Shamir must
be implemented in order to obtain non-interactive protocols.
• Include Bulletproofs in the comparison presented in the work by Canard
et al [16] and present our open source implementation [41].
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1.2 Organization
In Section 2 we describe possible use cases for ZKRPs. In Section 3 we give fun-
damental results that are important to understand the rest of the document. In
Section 4 we describe in detail how to implement ZKRP using different strate-
gies. In Section 5 we describe our implementation, while in Section 6 we com-
pare the schemes with respect to proof size, prover and verifier complexities. In
Section 7 we discuss related work and give some final remarks.
2 Applications
In order to give the reader a motivation to investigate further on Zero Knowledge
Proofs, we present in this section some interesting applications.
– Over 18. ZKRP is a special case of ZKSM, due to the fact that any
numeric interval is also a set. Therefore if the ZKSM is more efficient
than ZKRP, what turns out to be true in certain scenarios, then ZKSM
can replace ZKRP to improve performance.
– KYC. As explained above, ZKSM allows to validate that a determined
piece of private information belongs to a set of valid values. This property
may be used to ensure compliance, while preserving a client’s privacy. For
example, an interesting use case is the so-called anonymous credentials,
where a trusted party can attest that a user credential contains attributes
whose values are correct, namely the country of residence of a person being
validated by government, allowing the user to later prove that she lives in
a country that belongs to the European Union, without revealing which
country.
– Electronic voting. This is an important topic of research, which at-
tracted the attention of many researchers in last years. Different solu-
tions [22, 29, 7, 1] were proposed to different types of elections. Some
solutions are based on zero knowledge proofs, like ZKRP, proof of shuf-
fling, proof of decryption and other related techniques, while others use
different cryptographic primitives, like homomorphic threshold encryption
and Multi-Party Computation (MPC).
– Electronic auctions and procurement. Secure electronic auctions is
a subject that has being focus of research for a long time [36], and it
is an important motivation to in the study of ZKRPs, since it is one of
the main cryptographic techniques that can be used to construct secure
protocols. In particular, it is possible to remark the proposal of secure
constructions [46, 43, 39] for Vickrey auctions, where the winner pays the
second highest bid. A complementary problem to electronic auctions is
procurement, where parties concur for the lowest price. According to the
World Bank report [3], the volume of bribes in public sector procurement
is roughly US$200 billion per year.
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– Board membership. ZKSM can be used to construct ring signatures,
which allows someone to digitally sign a message in behalf of a group of
users. Afterwards, anyone can verify the signature indeed was generated
by a member of the group. This is interesting for example to allow a
member of a directing board to anonymously sign a contract.
– Anti-Money Laundering (AML). If we define the ZKSM set to be a list
of entities that can consume a determined service, then we can construct a
whitelist and an anonymous entity can prove that it is whitelisted and thus
has permission to use that service. Similarly, it is possible to construct
a blacklist formed by criminals, or by countries that are considered to be
non-cooperative against money laundering, as is the case of the Financial
Action Task Force [23] (FATF) blacklist. Hence an anonymous entity can
prove that it does not belong to the blacklist, ensuring AML compliance.
– Reputation validation. Consider a set formed by companies that have
good reputation, either because they are compliant to some regulation or
due to the fact that they are good payers, or, in general, because they
respect certain conditions. Then it is possible to use ZKSM to produce a
proof of reputation. This use case is a little bit different compared to the
previous ones, since in many practical scenarios we can not make public
the set of companies that have reputation or not. In other words, this
set itself is private. In this case, we must have a solution that is a little
bit different from the construction presented here in the paper. Actually,
there is line of research devoted to this topic, which is called cryptographic
accumulators. Although accumulators can not be directly constructed
based on ideas presented here in this document, there is indeed a close
relation between ZKSM and accumulators. In fact, one of the authors
of the ZKSM paper [11] described here, namely Camenisch, has many
papers [13, 12, 2] in this area.
– Common Reporting Standard (CRS). In 2014 forty-seven countries
agreed on the CRS proposal [42], whose main goal is to provide trans-
parency in a global level regarding financial information, in particular to
avoid tax fraud and tax evasion. The CRS allows automatic exchange of
information, based on XML schemas that are responsible to dynamically
describe the data format and validation patterns. Using ZKSM it is pos-
sible to carry on some of those possible validations, such as enumerations
and integer ranges. Hence we have that private-sensitive data can be val-
idated even if it is sent in its encrypted form. Therefore ZKSM may be
considered an important tool that can be reused to provide privacy on
demand.
The applications described above are general purpose, but could be inter-
esting also in the context of DLT and blockchain technology. Next we focus on
application that are important in the specific scenario of DLT and blockchain:
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– Confidential Transactions and Mimblewimble. In 2016, Confiden-
tial Transactions (CT) were proposed by Maxwell [38], which utilizes Ped-
ersen commitments [44] to hide transactions amounts. Instead of pub-
lishing the amounts being spent in the clear, each party uses the commit-
ment scheme to hide the amount, what makes it infeasible for an adversary
to obtain any information about transaction denominations. Since a Ped-
ersen commitment is homomorphic, it allows transactions outputs to be
added up without requiring to open the subjacent commitments. Also,
the commitment can be used to generate a ZKRP, which is sufficient to
validate that a transaction is correct. For instance, it is necessary to
show that the amount lies in the interval [0, 2n), where 2n is considerably
smaller than the size of the underlying group used to construct the Ped-
ersen commitment, ensuring there is no overflow; and 2n is big enough to
deal with every possible valid denomination.
However, the usage of ZKRP would make the size of transactions too
big. Namely, CT with just two outputs and 32 bits of precision would
require roughly a ZKRP whose size is 5 KB, leading to transactions whose
total size is equal to 5.4 KB. Thus, ZKRP would correspond to almost
93% of the transaction size. Therefore in order to use CT in Bitcoin,
we would need 160 GB only for ZKRP. If Bulletproofs where used in
replacement of the underlying range proof used in CT, then it would reduce
this requirement to only 17 GB.
Mimblewimble [45] is an optimization to CT that can make the size of the
ledger even smaller, by aggregating and compressing transactions in such
a way that avoids the necessity to download old and unspent transactions
outputs.
– Provisions. Provisions [20] is a protocol that allows a Bitcoin exchange to
prove it is solvent, by showing that each account has positive balance, and
also showing that the exchange has an amount of funds that is larger than
or equal to the summation of all individual account’s balance in the system.
The challenge here is to calculate a single zero knowledge proof based on
the information provided by different participants. This is difficult because
each individual balance is encrypted using distinct keys, thus combining
them is not straightforward, and requires MPC. Bulletproofs has a MPC
protocol that solves this problem efficiently. For instance, if we consider
a cryptocurrency exchange with 2 million clients, current implementation
of Provisions requires 62 MB of ZKRPs. However, using Bulletproofs
this number can be reduced to less than 2 KB, which corresponds to an
optimization factor of 300.
– Private smart contracts. Ethereum [54] allows to construct smart con-
tracts over blockchain, which can be seen as generic applications running
in a distributed way, therefore avoiding the necessity to have a central-
ized solution. In other words, a smart contract is a piece of code that
will run by all participants in Ethereum network. However, since there
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is no mechanism to provide privacy to the system, we have that all the
information in the smart contracts is visible by every other party, what
constitutes a huge issue in many scenarios. This problem could be solved
by using zk-SNARKs [30], but it requires a trusted setup, and this prob-
lem is even worse in the case of smart contracts, because we need a new
setup for each contract. Hawk [33] is an interesting proposal to implement
private smart contracts, however it not only needs a new setup for each
contract, but also requires a trusted manager, who can view the user pri-
vate information. Bulletproofs is an interesting proposal regarding private
smart contracts, since it avoids the trusted setup and offers a generic ZKP
protocol which has small proofs.
3 Fundamentals
In this section we define commitment schemes, zero knowledge proofs and other
important components that are necessary in order to comprehend this work.
The purpose of this section is not to present very formal definitions. To achieve
this goal, the reader can use Goldreich’s book [27].
Notation. Notation x ∈R S is used when variable x is set to a random
element of set S. We are going to use Camenisch and Stadler [15] notation for
proofs of knowledge:
PK{(δ, γ) : y = gδhγ ∧ (u ≤ δ ≤ v)},
which denotes a proof of knowledge of integers δ and γ such that y = gδhγ and
u ≤ δ ≤ v. In other words, this notation means that y is the commitment to the
secret value δ, which is contained in the interval [u, v). Greek letters are used
to denote values that must be known only to the prover. For instance, we have
that δ is her private data, while γ is a random value that is used to hide δ.
Finally, we use notation x
?
= y to check if x is equal or not to y.
3.1 Assumptions
The constructions presented in this paper are based on the assumptions de-
scribed in this section.
The strong RSA assumption first appeared in the work of Fujisaki and
Okamoto [25]. It is a stronger assumption with respect to the conventional
RSA assumption, because any adversary who can break the RSA assumption
would also be able to break the strong RSA assumption.
Definition 1 Strong RSA assumption. Given an RSA-modulus n and an
element y ∈ Z?n, it is infeasible to find integers e 6= ±1 and x, such that y = xe
(mod n).
Definition 2 Discrete Logarithm assumption. Let G be a group of prime
order q, a generator g ∈ G and an arbitrary element y ∈ G, it is infeasible to
find x ∈ Zq, such that y = gx.
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Definition 3 q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. Given groups G1 and
GT , associated with a secure bilinear pairing map e; given generator g ∈ G1 and
powers gx, . . . , gx
q
, for x ∈r Zp, we have that it is infeasible for an adversary to
output (c, g1/(x+c)), where c ∈ Zp.
It is important to remark that these assumptions are not valid if quan-
tum computers come to existence. Therefore, the research of quantum-resistant
ZKPs is a very important subject.
3.2 Commitment
Shortly, a cryptographic commitment allows someone to compute a value that
hides some message without ambiguity, in the sense that no one later will be
able to argue that this value corresponds to a different message. In other words,
given the impossibility to change the hidden message, we say that the user
committed to that message. The purpose of using a commitment scheme is to
allow a prover to compute zero knowledge proofs where the hidden message is
the underlying witness w.
Definition 4 A commitment scheme is defined by algorithms Commit and
Open as follows:
– c = Commit(m, r). Given a message m and randomness r, compute as
output a value c that, informally, hides message m and such that it is hard
to compute message m′ and randomness r′ that satisfies Commit(m′, r′) =
Commit(m, r). In particular, it is hard to invert function Commit to find
m or r.
– b = Open(c,m, r). Given a commitment c, a message m and randomness
r, the algorithm returns true if and only if c = Commit(m, r).
A commitment scheme has 2 properties:
• Binding. Given a commitment c, it is hard to compute a different pair of
message and randomness whose commitment is c. This property guaran-
tees that there is no ambiguity in the commitment scheme, and thus after
c is published it is hard to open it to a different value.
• Hiding. It is hard to compute any information about m given c.
A well known commitment scheme is called Pedersen commitment [44].
Given group Zp, of prime order p, where the discrete logarithm problem is
infeasible, the commitment is computed as follows:
c = Commit(m, r) = gmhr.
In order to open this commitment, given message m and randomness r,
we simply recompute it and compare with c. An interesting property is that
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Pedersen commitment is homomorphic. Namely, we have that for arbitrary
messages m1 and m2 and randomness r1 and r2, such that ci = Commit(mi, ri)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, then
c1.c2 = Commit(m1 +m2, r1 + r2).
Pedersen commitment is commonly implemented using groups over elliptic
curves instead Zp. Also, it is important to remark that if the discrete logarithm
of h with respect to g is known, then it is easy to generate m′ and r′ such that
Commit(m′, r′) = Commit(m, r), breaking the binding property. Thus in order
to generate h securely, we must use a hash function that maps binary public
strings to elliptic curve points [8].
Another commitment scheme that will be required later in this document
is the Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment [25]. The formula to calculate the com-
mitment itself is the same as in Pedersen commitment, namely gmhr. The
difference is the underlying group, which for the Fujisaki-Okamoto is given by
an RSA group Zn, where n = pq and p and q are safe primes, what means that
(p− 1)/2 and (q− 1)/2 are also prime numbers. Also, we have that the domain
over which randomness r is chosen is different, because the Fujisaki-Okamoto
commitment requires r ∈ [2−sn + 1, 2sn − 1], with s chosen in such a man-
ner that 2−s is negligible. Interestingly, in the original paper [25] Fujisaki and
Okamoto propose an interactive protocol for Zero Knowledge Range Proofs, but
unfortunately the performance is not good for practical usage.
3.3 Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) were proposed in 1989 by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rackoff [28]. Using this kind of cryptographic primitive it is possible to show
that some statement is true about a secret data, without revealing any other
information about the secret beyond this statement. Since then, ZKP became
an important field of research, because it provides a new characterization of the
complexity class NP, using the so-called interactive programs, and also because
it is very useful to construct many cryptographic primitives. Given an element
x of a language L ∈ NP , an entity called prover is able to convince a verifier
that x indeed belongs to L, i.e. there exists a witness w for x. In particular we
are interested in proof of knowledge (PoK), where the prover not only convinces
about the existence of some witness, but also shows that the prover in fact
knows a specific witness w. A desirable characteristic of such proof systems is
succinctness, informally meaning that the proof size is small and thus can be
verified efficiently. Such constructions are called zk-SNARKs [30]. However,
although asymptotically good, zk-SNARKs still have some limitations and for
some specific problems it turns out that different approaches achieve better
performance, as we will show in this document.
Nowadays ZKP is being used to provide privacy to DLT and blockchain. For
instance, it allows to design private payment systems. In summary, we would like
to permit parties to transfer digital money, while hiding not only their identities
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but also the amount being transferred, known as denomination. ZKP can be
used to hide this information, but still permitting validation of transactions. An
important validation is showing that the denomination is positive, otherwise
some payer would be able to receive money by using negative amounts. In
this context we have that zk-SNARKs don’t provide good performance when
compared to protocols designed specifically for this purpose. The focus of this
document is the description of different constructions of ZKRP and compare
them to understand when to use each scheme in practice. More concretely,
ZKRP allows some party Alice, known as the prover, and who possesses a secret
δ, to prove to another party Bob, known as the verifier, that δ belongs to the
interval [u, v), for arbitrary integers u and v.
Definition 5 A Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proof scheme
is defined by algorithms Setup, Prove and Verify as follows:
– Setup algorithm is responsible for the generation of parameters. Con-
cretely, we have that params = Setup(λ), where the input is the security
parameter λ and the output is the parameters of the ZKP system of algo-
rithms.
– Prove syntax is given by proof = Prove(x,w). The algorithm receives
as input an instance x of some NP-language L, and the witness w, and
outputs the zero knowledge proof.
– Verify algorithm receives the proof as input and outputs a bit b, which is
equal to 1 if the verifier accepts the proof.
It is important to remark that not all ZKP schemes are non-interactive. On
contrary, most ZKP protocols described in the literature are in fact interactive.
In general, the prover must answer challenge messages sent by the verifier in
order to convince him that the proof is valid, what requires multiple rounds of
communication. In the context of DLT and blockchain applications, we would
like to avoid this communication, because either (i) validating nodes can not
properly agree on how to choose those challenges, since in many constructions
we have to choose them randomly, while the verification algorithm must be
deterministic in order to reach consensus; or (ii) because it would make the
communication complexity of the system very poor. Nevertheless, the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [24] is a generic technique that allows to convert interactive
ZKP schemes into non-interactive protocols. The drawback of this heuristic
is that it makes the cryptosystem secure under the random oracle model [5]
(ROM). In particular, it is straightforward to make the ZKRP schemes described
in this document non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
A zero knowledge proof scheme has the following properties:
• Completeness. Given a witness w that satisfies instance x, we have that
Verify(Prove(x,w)) = 1.
• Soundness. If the witness w does not satisfy x, then the probability
Prob[Verify(Prove(x,w)) = 1] is sufficiently low.
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• Zero Knowledge. Given the interaction between prover and verifier, we
call this interaction a view. In order to capture the zero knowledge prop-
erty we use a polynomial-time simulator, which has access to the same
input given to the verifier (including its randomness), but no access to
the input of the prover, to generate a simulated view. We say that the
ZKP scheme has perfect zero knowledge if the simulated view, under the
assumption that x ∈ L, has the same distribution as the original view.
We say that the ZKP scheme has statistical zero knowledge if those distri-
butions are statistically close. We say that the ZKP scheme has computa-
tional zero knowledge if there is no polynomial-time distinguisher for those
distributions. Intuitively, the existence of such a simulator means that
whatever the verifier can compute from the interaction with the prover, it
was already possible to compute before such interaction, hence the verifier
learned nothing from it. Also, we say that it is a proof of knowledge if we
can find an extractor, who has rewindable black-box access to the prover,
that can compute the witness w with non-negligible probability.
3.4 Bilinear Pairings
Some constructions of ZKRP are based on the existence of a secure bilinear map
bp = (G1,G2,Gt, e, g1, g2), where G1, G2 and Gt are groups of sufficiently large
prime order, g1 and g2 are generators of G1 and G2 respectively and e is an
appropriate choice of bilinear map, satisfying the usual requirements: (i) non-
degeneracy; (ii) efficiently computable and (iii) bilinearity. This cryptographic
primitive is key to the constructions we will present in the next sections and it
is important to remark that care must be taken when instantiating such prim-
itive [26, 53]. Barreto-Naehrig [4] elliptic curves permit to implement bilinear
maps efficiently.
4 Zero Knowledge Range Proofs
The first constructions of ZKRP protocols were presented decades ago, with
schemes like the one proposed in 1995 by Damg˚ard [21] and in 1997 by Fujisaki
and Okamoto [25]. Unfortunately those proposals are not efficient to be used in
practice. The first practical construction was proposed by Boudot in 2001 [9]. In
this document we will focus on constructions that came after Boudot’s proposal.
In this section we describe in detail different strategies to achieve ZKRP. A
summary of the main characteristics of each family of constructions follows:
• Square decomposition. One of the ideas that can be used to obtain zero
knowledge range proofs is the decomposition of the secret element into a
sum of squares, as proposed in 2001 by Boudot [9]. In 2003 Lipmaa et
al [35] improved the construction using Lagrange’s four squares theorem.
In 2005 Groth [29] observed that if the element is in the form 4n + 1,
then it is possible to get the same result by decomposing only into three
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squares. The drawback of this approach is that the algorithm by Rabin
and Shallit [47], required for the decomposition into squares, runs in time
O(k4), where k is the size of the secret. Both Lipmaa [35] and Groth [29]
improved this algorithm, but in practice we have that it leads to a poor
performance for the Prover’s algorithm.
• Signature-based. Another idea for the prover is to prove, in a blind way,
that he knows a signature on the secret. Initially, all elements in the inter-
val are signed, then the proof that the prover knows the signature means
that this integer belongs to the expected interval. In fact this interval can
be any possible finite set, which means that this solution can be used to
construct ZK Set Membership. In 2008 Camenisch, Chaabouni and shelat
used bilinear pairings to construct an efficient ZKSM scheme [11] that may
be used also for ZKRP.
• Multi-base decomposition. A common approach that one could follow
to build ZKRP schemes is to decompose the secret into the bit repre-
sentation, which allows to prove that it belongs to the interval by using
Boolean arithmetic. Basically, the prover must commit to each bit of the
secret; provide a zero knowledge proof that it is indeed a bit; and show a
zero knowledge proof that the representation is valid. This last condition
may easily be achieved by the utilization of homomorphic commitments.
If instead of using the bit representation we use u-ary representation, then
we can obtain more efficient constructions, as pointed out in [11]. Another
possible strategy is to use the so-called multi-base decomposition [49, 37],
which is an alternative way to represent the secret and it allows to build
ZKRP schemes that are good for the case of small secrets. In [16] the
authors propose a new scheme and provide a comparison among different
proposals in the literature. In summary, regarding the verifier’s complex-
ity, their construction is good for very small secrets (5 bits). For secret
bit-length between 5 and 25 the scheme proposed in [37] is the best option,
while for more than 25 bits the signature-based scheme proposed in [11] is
the best alternative. It is important to remark that although the square
decomposition strategy has constant complexity, it only provides an inter-
esting performance for huge secrets, say, more than 500 bits. The reason
is because those schemes are based on the strong RSA assumption, which
requires big variables and inherently allows the usage of big secrets.
• Bulletproofs. Unfortunately, all the schemes previously above-mentioned
depends upon a trusted setup, which may not be interesting in the con-
text of cryptocurrencies. For instance, if an adversary is able to circumvent
this trusted setup, he would be able to create money out of thin air. Re-
cently, Bu¨nz et al [10] proposed a new idea to construct ZKRP, which they
called Bulletproofs. They proposed to use an inner product proof in order
to achieve ZKRP with very small proof sizes. Also, they showed how to
use a component called multi-exponentiation in order to optimize their
construction. The authors also provided an efficient implementation that
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shows their proposal is adequate for many practical scenarios. However,
this proposal was not included in the comparison by Canard et al [16],
then one of the contributions of this work is to analyze how Bulletproofs
compares to the other proposals. Actually, Bulletproofs is based on the
decomposition of the secret into its bit representation, thus it fits the cat-
egory described previously, but since it proposed a different framework
for generating ZKPs, namely using PoK for inner product relations, then
we considered important to separate Bulletproofs in order to give it more
focus.
4.1 Square decomposition construction
In this section we describe the algorithms necessary to implement the ZKRP
proposed by Boudot [9] in 2001. This construction requires some building blocks,
like the zero knowledge proof that two commitments hide the same secret and
the zero knowledge proof that the secret is a square. These schemes are based
on the strong RSA assumption, then we have that n must be the product of safe
primes.
We denote the zero knowledge proof that two commitments hide the same
secret by PKSS = {x, r1, r2 : E = gx1hr11 ∧ F = gx2hr22 }. The parameters for
the PKSS scheme is given by paramsSS = (t, `, s1, s2), which must be set in
order to achieve the desired level of security. Namely, we have that soundness is
given by 2t−1, while the zero knowledge property is guaranteed given that 1/` is
negligible. Next we present algorithms ProveSS and VerifySS. It is important to
remark that the discrete logarithm of g1 with respect to h1, or its inverse, must
be unknown, otherwise the commitment is not secure. Analogously, we have
that the same condition must be valid for g2 and h2. The hash function is such
that it outputs 2t-bit strings. Finally, we have that s1 and s2 must be chosen
in order to have secure commitments, i.e. 2si must be negligible for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Algorithm 1 Proof of Same Secret: ProveSS
INPUT x, r1, r2, E, F,paramsSS.
OUTPUT proofSS.
ω ∈R [1, 2`+tb− 1],
η1 ∈R [1, 2`+t+s1n− 1],
η2 ∈R [1, 2`+t+s2n− 1],
Ω1 = g
ω
1 h
η1
1 ,
Ω2 = g
ω
2 h
η2
2 ,
c = Hash(Ω1||Ω2),
D = ω + cx,
D1 = η1 + cr1,
D2 = η2 + cr2,
return proofSS = (c,D,D1, D2).
We denote the zero knowledge proof that a secret is a square by PKS =
{x, r1 : E = gx2hr}. We have that paramsS = (t, `, s) represents the parameters
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Algorithm 2 Proof of Same Secret: VerifySS
INPUT E,F,proofSS.
OUTPUT True or false.
return c
?
= Hash(gD1 h
D1
1 E
−c||gD2 hD22 F−c).
for the PKS scheme, so that soundness is given by 2
t−1 and the zero knowledge
property is guaranteed if 1/` is negligible, as before. Algorithms 3 and 4 cor-
responds to ProveS and VerifyS, respectively. Also, the discrete logarithm of g
with respect to h, or its inverse, must be unknown, otherwise the commitment
is not secure.
Algorithm 3 Proof of Square: ProveS
INPUT x, r1, E, paramsS.
OUTPUT proofS.
r2 ∈R [−2sn+ 1, 2sn− 1],
F = gxhr2 ,
r3 = r1 − r2x,
proofSS = ProveSS(x, r2, r3, E, F ),
return proofS = (E,F,proofSS).
Algorithm 4 Proof of Square: VerifyS
INPUT proofS.
OUTPUT True or false.
return VerifySS(E,F,proofSS).
We denote the zero knowledge proof that a secret belongs to a larger interval,
originally proposed by Chan et al [18], by using notation PKLI = {x, r : E =
gxhr∧x ∈ [−2t+`b, 2t+`b]}. We have that paramsLI = (t, `, s) represents the pa-
rameters for the PKLI scheme, so that completeness is achieved with probability
greater than 1−2`; soundness is given by 2t−1 and the zero knowledge property
is guaranteed if 1/` is negligible. Algorithms 5 and 6 corresponds to ProveLI
and VerifyLI, respectively. Also, the discrete logarithm of g with respect to h,
or its inverse, must be unknown.
Before describing Boudot’s ZKRP construction, we first need a proof with
tolerance, denoted by PKWT = {x, r : E = gxhr ∧ x ∈ [a − θ, b + θ]}, where
θ = 2t+`+1
√
b− a, as shown in Algorithms 7 and 8.
Algorithms 9 and 10 describe the ZKRP scheme proposed by Boudot [9] in
2001.
4.2 Signature-based construction
The idea of the protocol is that the verifier initially computes digital signa-
tures for each element in the target set S. The prover then blinds this digital
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Algorithm 5 Proof of Larger Interval: ProveLI
INPUT x, r, E, paramsLI.
OUTPUT proofLI.
repeat
ω ∈R [0, 2t+`b− 1],
η ∈r [−2t+`+sn+ 1, 2t+`+sn− 1],
Ω = gωhη (mod n),
C = Hash(Ω),
c = C (mod 2t),
D1 = ω + xc,
D2 = η + xc ∈ Z,
till D1 ∈ [cb, 2t+lb− 1].
return (C,D1, D2).
Algorithm 6 Proof of Larger Interval: VerifyLI
INPUT proofLI.
OUTPUT True or false.
return D1
?∈ [cb, 2t+`b− 1] ∧ C ?= Hash(gD1hD2E−c).
signature by raising it to a randomly chosen exponent v ∈ Zp, such that it is
computationally infeasible to determine which element was signed. The prover
uses the pairing to compute the proof, and the bilinearity of the pairing allows
the verifier to check that indeed one of the elements from S were initially cho-
sen. Algorithms 11, 12 and 13 show the details of the this protocol. The scheme
depends upon Boneh-Boyen digital signatures, summarized in next.
Boneh-Boyen [6] signatures. Shortly, the signer private key is given by
x ∈R Zp and the public key is y = gx. Given message m, we have that the
digital signature is calculated as σ = g1/(x+m), and verification is achieved by
computing e(σ, ygm)
?
= e(g, g).
Boneh-Boyen signatures are based on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion, described in Definition 3.
Range Proof. In order to obtain ZKRP, we can decompose the secret δ
into base u, as follows:
δ =
∑
0≤j≤`
δju
j .
Therefore, if each δj belongs to the interval [0, u), then we have that δ ∈
[0, u`). The ZKSM algorithms can be easily adapted to carry out this compu-
tation, as shown in Algorithms 14, 15 and 16.
In order to obtain Zero Knowledge Range Proofs for arbitrary ranges [a, b)
we show that δ ∈ [a, a+u`) and δ ∈ [b−u`, b), using 2 times the ZKRP scheme
described in Algorithm 15. Namely, we have to prove that δ − b + u` ∈ [0, u`)
and δ − a ∈ [0, u`).
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Algorithm 7 Proof with Tolerance: ProveWT
INPUT x, r, E.
OUTPUT proofWT.
Compute the proof of opening of commitment E.
Ea = E/g
a (mod n),
Eb = g
b/E (mod n),
xa = x− a,
xb = b− x,
Alice proves that she knows x, which is greater that −θ.
xa1 = b
√
x− ac,
xa2 = xa − x2a1 ,
xb1 = b
√
b− xc,
xb2 = xb − x2b1 ,
repeat
ra1 ∈R [−2sn+ 1, 2sn− 1],
ra2 = r − ra1 ,
till ra2 ∈ [−2sn+ 1, 2sn− 1].
Choose rb1 and rb2 such that rb1 + rb2 = −r.
Ea1 = g
x2a1hra1 ,
Ea2 = g
xa2hra2 ,
Eb1 = g
x2b1hrb1 ,
Eb2 = g
xb2hrb2 ,
proofSa = ProveS(xa1 , ra1 , Ea1),
proofSb = ProveS(xb1 , rb1 , Eb1),
proofLIa = ProveLI(xa2 , ra2 , Ea2),
proofLIb = ProveLI(xb2 , rb2 , Eb2),
return proofWT = (Ea1 , Ea2 , Eb1 , Eb2 ,proofSa ,proofSb ,proofLIa ,proofLIb).
Algorithm 8 Proof with Tolerance: VerifyWT
INPUT proofWT.
OUTPUT True or false.
if Ea2
?
= Ea/Ea1 ∧ Eb2 ?= Eb/Eb1 then
bS = VerifyS(proofSa) ∧VerifyS(proofSb),
bLI = VerifyLI(proofLIa),∧VerifyLI(proofLIb),
return bS ∧ bLI.
return False
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Algorithm 9 Square Decomposition Range Proof: ProveSD
INPUT x, r,R.
OUTPUT proofSD.
x′ = 2Tx,
r′ = 2T r,
T = 2(t+ `+ 1) + |b− a|,
E′ = E2
T
,
proofWT = ProveWT(x
′, r′, E′),
return proofSD = (E
′,proofWT).
Algorithm 10 Square Decomposition Range Proof: VerifySD
INPUT proofSD.
OUTPUT True or false.
if E′ ?= E2
T
then
return VerifyWT(proofWT).
return False
Algorithm 11 Set Membership: SetupZKSM
INPUT g, h and a set S.
OUTPUT y ∈ G and A ∈ G|S|.
x ∈R Zp,
y = gx ,
for i ∈ S do
Ai = g
1
x+i .
return y, [Ai].
Algorithm 12 Set Membership: ProveZKSM
INPUT g, h, a commitment C, and a set S.
OUTPUT δ, γ such that C = gδhγ and δ ∈ S.
τ ∈R Zp,
V = Aτδ ,
s, t,m ∈R Zp,
a = e(V, g)−s.e(g, g)t,
D = gshm,
c = Hash(V, a,D),
zδ = s− δc,
zτ = t− τc,
zγ = m− γc.
return proofZKSM = (V, a,D, zδ, zτ , zγ).
Algorithm 13 Set Membership: VerifyZKSM
INPUT g, h, a commitment C, proofZKSM.
OUTPUT True or false.
return D
?
= Cchzγgzδ ∧ a ?= e(V, y)c.e(V, g)−zδ .e(g, g)zτ .
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Algorithm 14 Signature-based Range Proof: SetupZKRP for interval [0, u
`)
INPUT g, h, u, ` and a commitment C.
OUTPUT δ, γ such that C = gδhγ and δ ∈ [0, u`).
x ∈R Zp
y = gx
for i ∈ Zu do
Ai = g
1
x+i .
return y, [Ai].
Algorithm 15 Signature-based Range Proof: ProveZKRP for interval [0, u
`)
INPUT g, h, u, ` and a commitment C.
OUTPUT δ, γ such that C = gδhγ and δ ∈ [0, u`).
Find [δj ] such that δ =
∑
j δju
j ,
τj ∈R Zp,
Set D to the identity element in G.
for j ∈ Z` do
Vj = A
τj
δj
,
sj , tj ,mj ∈r Zp,
aj = e(Vj , g)
−sj .e(g, g)tj ,
D = Dgu
jsjhmj .
c = Hash([Vj ], a,D).
for j ∈ Z` do
zδj = sj − δjc,
zτj = tj − τjc.
zγ = m− γc.
return proofZKRP = (zγ , [zδj ], [zτj ]).
Algorithm 16 Signature-based Range Proof: VerifyZKRP for interval [0, u
`)
INPUT g, h, u, ` and proofZKRP.
OUTPUT True or false.
Set a to True.
for j ∈ Z` do
a = a ∧ (aj ?= e(Vj , y)c.e(Vj , g)−zδj .e(g, g)zτj ).
return D
?
= Cchzγ
∏
j (u
jzδj ) ∧ a.
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4.3 Bulletproofs construction
In this section we show a detailed description of the algorithms necessary to
implement the Bulletproofs ZKRP protocol.
Notation. Given an array a ∈ Gn, we use Python notation to represent
array slices:
a[:`] = [a1, . . . , a`] ∈ G`,
a[`:] = [a`+1, . . . , an] ∈ Gn−`
Given k ∈ G, we denote the vector containing the powers of k by
kn = [1, k, k2, . . . , kn−1].
Given g = [g1, . . . , gn] ∈ Gn and a ∈ Znp , we define ga as follows:
ga =
n∏
i=1
gaii .
Given c ∈ Zp, notation b = c.a ∈ Znp is a vector such that bi = c.ai. Also,
a ◦ b = (a1b1, . . . , anbn) is the Hadamard product. The vector polynomial
p(X) =
∑n
i=0 piX
i ∈ Znp [X], where each coefficient pi is a vector in Znp . The
inner product of such polynomials is given by
〈l(X), r(X)〉 =
d∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
〈li, rj〉Xi+j ∈ Zp[X]. (1)
4.3.1 Setup
Many ZKRP constructions depend on a trusted setup. Shortly, the parameters
necessary to generate and verify the underlying zero knowledge proofs must be
computed by a trusted party, because if such parameters are generated using a
trapdoor, then this trapdoor could be used to subvert the protocol, allowing to
generate money out of thin air.
In order to avoid the trusted setup, Bulletproofs use the Nothing Up My
Sleeve (NUMS) strategy, where a hash function [8] is utilized to compute the
generators that will be necessary for the Pedersen commitments, as described
in Algorithm 17, which describes the specific case where the subjacent elliptic
curve is given by Koblitz curve secp256k1 [48, 31].
4.3.2 Inner product argument
In this section we present the main building block of Bulletproofs, which is
the inner product argument. In summary, using this ZKP protocol the prover
convinces a verifier that she knows vectors whose inner product is equal to
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Algorithm 17 Nothing Up My Sleeve: MapToGroup
INPUT The input string m, and the field prime modulus p.
OUTPUT An elliptic curve point if successful or some error.
i = 0.
while i < 256 do
x = Hash(m, i).
rhs = x3 + 7 (mod p).
if rhs is a square (mod p) then
y =
√
rhs (mod p).
if (x, y) is not the point at infinity then
return (x, y).
i = i+ 1.
return “Can not map to group”.
Algorithm 18 Compute Generators: ComputeGenerators
INPUT The elliptic curve public generator g ∈ G and an integer n.
OUTPUT The set of generators (g, h,g,h).
Compute h = MapToGroup(′some public string′, p).
i = 0.
while i < n do
c ∈R Zp,
d ∈R Zp,
g[i] = c.G,
h[i] = d.G,
i = i+ 1.
return (g, h,g,h).
Algorithm 19 SetupIP
INPUT The set of generators (g, h,g,h).
OUTPUT paramsIP.
u = MapToGroup(′some other public string′, p).
return paramsIP = (g, h,g,h, u).
Algorithm 20 SetupRP
INPUT The input interval [a, b) and the field modulus p.
OUTPUT paramsRP.
if b is not a power of 2 then
return “b must be a power of 2”.
else
n = log2 b,
(g, h,g,h) = ComputeGenerators(g, n),
paramsIP = SetupIP(g, h,g,h),
paramsRP = (paramsIP, n),
return paramsRP.
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Algorithm 21 Vector Commitment: CommitIP
INPUT (paramsIP,a,b).
OUTPUT The commitment P .
Compute P = gahb ∈ G.
return P .
Algorithm 22 Proof of Inner Product: ProveIP
INPUT (paramsIP, commitIP, c,a,b).
OUTPUT proofIP.
x = Hash(g,h, P, c) ∈ Z?p
Compute P ′ = ux.cP .
Allocate arrays l, r ∈ Gn.
ComputeProof(g,h, P ′, ux,a,b, l, r).
proofIP = (g,h, P
′, ux,a,b, l, r).
return proofIP.
Algorithm 23 Proof of Inner Product: ComputeProof
INPUT (g,h, P, u, a, b, l, r).
OUTPUT (g,h, P, u, a, b, l, r).
x = Hash(g,h, P, c) ∈ Z?p.
Compute P ′ = ux.cP .
if n = 1 then
return (g,h, P, u, a, b, l, r).
else
n′ = n2 ,
cL = 〈a[:n′],b[n′:]〉 ∈ Zp,
cR = 〈a[n′:],b[:n′]〉 ∈ Zp,
L = g
a[:n′]
[n′:] h
b[n′:]
[:n′] u
cL ∈ G,
R = g
a[n′:]
[:n′] h
b[:n′]
[n′:] u
cR ∈ G.
Append L,R to l, r, respectively.
x = Hash(L,R),
g′ = gx
−1
[:n′]g
x
[n′:] ∈ Gn
′
,
h′ = gx[:n′]g
x−1
[n′:] ∈ Gn
′
,
P ′ = Lx
2
PRx
−2 ∈ G,
a′ = a[:n′]x+ a[n′:]x−1 ∈ Zn′p ,
b′ = b[:n′]x−1 + b[n′:]x ∈ Zn′p .
Recursively run ComputeProof on input (g′,h′, P ′, u,a′,b′, l, r).
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Algorithm 24 Proof of Inner Product: VerifyIP
INPUT paramsIP, commitIP,proofIP.
OUTPUT True or false.
i = 0.
while i < log n do
n′ = n2 ,
x = Hash(l[i], r[i]),
g′ = gx
−1
[:n′]g
x
[n′:] ∈ Gn
′
,
h′ = gx[:n′]g
x−1
[n′:] ∈ Gn
′
,
P ′ = Lx
2
PRx
−2 ∈ G,
i = i+ 1.
The verifier computes c = a.b and accepts if P = gahbuc.
a determined public value. First we describe the initialization procedure in
Algorithm 22. Afterwards we present the main protocol, given by Algorithm 23.
The fact that Bulletproofs allows to halve the size of the problem in each level
of the recursion in Algorithm 23 means that it is possible to obtain logarithmic
proof size.
4.3.3 Range proof argument
Given a secret value v, if we want to prove it belongs to the interval [0, 2n), then
we do the following:
• Prove that aL ∈ {0, 1}n is the bit-decomposition of v. In other words, we
show that
〈aL,2n〉 = v.
• Define aR as the component-wise complement of aL, what means that, for
every i ∈ [0, n], if the i-th bit of aL is 0, then the i-th bit of aR is equal
to 1. Conversely, if the i-th bit of aL is 1, then the i-th bit of aR is equal
to 0. Equivalently, this condition can be shortly described by Equations 2
and 3.
aL ◦ aR = 0n, (2)
aR = aL − 1n (mod 2). (3)
In order to prove that aL and aR satisfy both relations, we can randomly
choose y ∈ Zp and compute:
〈aL,aR ◦ yn〉 = 0,
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〈aL − 1n − aR,yn〉 = 0.
These two equations can be combined into a single inner product, by
randomly choosing z ∈ Zp, and computing
〈aL − z.1n,yn ◦ (aR + z.1n) + z2.2n〉 = z2v + δ(y, z), (4)
where δ(y, z) = (z − z2)〈1n,yn〉 − z3〈1n,2n〉 ∈ Zp.
If the prover could send the vectors in Equation 4, then the verifier would be
able to check the inner product himself. However, this vector reveals information
about aL, therefore revealing bits of the secret value v. To solve this problem
the prover randomly chooses vectors sL and sR in order to blind aL and aR,
respectively. Consider the following polynomials:
l[X] = aL − z.1n + sL.X ∈ Znp ,
r[X] = yn ◦ (aR + z.1n + sR.X) + z22n ∈ Znp ,
t[X] = 〈l[X], r[X]〉 = t0 + t1.X + t2.X2,
where the above inner product is computed as defined in Equation 1.
Note that the constant terms of l[X] and r[X] correspond to the vectors in
Equation 4. Therefore if the prover publishes l[x] and r[x] for a specific x ∈ Zp,
then we have that terms sL and sR ensure no information about aL and aR is
revealed.
Explicitly, we have that
t1 = 〈aL − z.1n,yn.sR〉+ 〈sL,yn.(aR + z.1n)〉, (5)
and
t2 = 〈sL,yn.sR〉. (6)
In order to make Bulletproofs non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic. Concretely, we compute x = Hash(T1, T2), y = Hash(A,S), and z =
Hash(A,S, y) in Algorithms 25 and 26.
4.3.4 Optimizations
The algorithms described in last section can be optimized in two ways, as follows:
• Multi-exponentiation. In the inner-product argument presented in Sec-
tion 4.3.2 it is required to computed many exponentiations, which is an
expensive operation. For instance, in the k-th round of the protocol we
must perform n
2k−1 exponentiations, thus in total we must execute 4n
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Algorithm 25 Bulletproofs: ProveRP
INPUT paramsRP, v.
OUTPUT proofRP.
γ ∈R Zp,
V = gvhγ ∈ G,
aL ∈ {0, 1}n such that 〈aL,2n〉 = v,
aR = aL − 1n ∈ Znp ,
α ∈R Zp,
A = hαgaLhaR ∈ G,
sL, sR ∈R Znp ,
ρ ∈R Zp,
S = hρgsLhsR ∈ G,
y = Hash(A,S) ∈ Z?p,
z = Hash(A,S, y) ∈ Z?p,
τ1, τ2 ∈R Zp,
T1 = g
t1hτ1 ∈ G,
T2 = g
t2hτ2 ∈ G,
x = Hash(T1, T2) ∈ Z?p,
l = l(X) = aL − z1n + sLX ∈ Znp ,
r = r(X) = yn ◦ (aR + z1n + sRX) + z22n ∈ Znp ,
tˆ = 〈l, r〉 ∈ Zp,
τx = τ2x
2 + τ1x+ z
2γ ∈ Zp,
µ = α+ ρx ∈ Zp,
commitIP = CommitIP(paramsIP, l, r),
proofIP = ProveIP(paramsIP, commitIP, tˆ, l, r),
proofRP = (τx, µ, tˆ, V, A, S, T1, T2, commitIP,proofIP).
return proofRP.
Algorithm 26 Bulletproofs: VerifyRP
INPUT paramsRP,proofRP.
OUTPUT True or false.
y = Hash(A,S) ∈ Z?p,
z = Hash(A,S, y) ∈ Z?p,
x = Hash(T1, T2) ∈ Z?p,
hi = h
y−i+1
i ∈ G,∀i ∈ [1, n],
Pl = P.h
µ,
Pr = A.S
x.g−z.(h′)z.y
n+z2.2n ∈ G,
output1 = (Pl
?
= Pr),
output2 = (g
tˆhτx
?
= V z
2
.gδ(y,z).T x1 .T
x2
2 ),
output3 = VerifyIP(proofIP),
return output1 ∧ output2 ∧ output3.
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exponentiations. It is possible to reduce this number to a single multi-
exponentiation of size 2n by postponing these computations to the last
round.
Concretely, given g = [g1, . . . , gn], we have that it is possible to compute
g an h, the generators obtained in last round, by using the following
expressions:
g =
n∏
i=1
gsii ∈ G,
h =
n∏
i=1
h
1/si
i ∈ G,
where
si =
log2 n∏
j=1
x
b(i,j)
j
and
b(i, j) =
{
1, if the j-th bit of i− 1 is 1
−1, otherwise
Therefore, verification can be performed by
ga.s.hb.s
−1
.ua.b
?
= P.
log2 n∏
j=1
L
x2j
j .R
x−2j
j .
• Aggregation. If multiple range proofs use the same underlying interval,
then it is possible to aggregate them into one single ZKRP. Using this
optimization, we have that new proofs can be added by only increasing
the total size of the proof by a logarithmic factor. Consider we want to
aggregate m range proofs. Then, while the naive strategy would lead us
to a proof whose size is m times larger, this aggregation procedure in
Bulletproofs allows the proof to grow only by a factor of 2 log2m.
In practice, applications like Confidential Transactions [38], Mimblewim-
ble [45] and Provisions [20] would benefit a lot from the utilization of
aggregation, because indeed such applications must execute many ZKRPs
over the same interval.
5 Implementation
We implemented the constructions described in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. The
scheme based on square decomposition, i.e. Boudot’s construction, was imple-
mented in Java and Solidity, while the signature-based scheme and Bulletproofs
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were implemented in Golang and they were based on libsecp256k1 library, avail-
able in Go-Ethereum. We used BN128 pairing-friendly elliptic curves, thus ac-
complishing 128 bits of security. The performance is summarized in Table 1,
and the measurement was carried out in a computer with a 64-bit Intel i5-6300U
2.40GHz CPU, 16 GB of RAM and Ubuntu 18.04. The implementation is avail-
able on Github [41] and is a proof of concept, thus it should not be used in
production without first spending the effort to review it where necessary.
Optimal values for u and ` can be calculated as described in the original
paper [11]. We used u = 57 and ` = 5 for the interval [347184000, 599644800),
obtaining communication complexity equal to 30976 bits, while the previous
work, based on Boudot’s proposal [9], has 48946 bits.
Scheme Setup (ms) Prove (ms) Verify (ms)
[9] 331.41 579.32 851.89
[11] 31.78 70.18 98.95
[10] 13.11 96.25 51.86
[10] a 17.20 22.38 3.27
a optimized implementation
Table 1: Time complexity
A more detailed comparison is presented in next section, showing the per-
formance data for different range sizes.
6 Comparison
In this section we compare the schemes presented in Section 4 with respect to
proof size and the complexity of Prove and Verify algorithms. We chose the
most efficient proposal from each different strategy in order to do the com-
parison. Namely, we used the proposal by Lipmaa et al [37] to represent the
multi-base solution; the proposal by Lipmaa [35] to represent the square decom-
position strategy; the scheme by Camenisch et al [11] for the signature-based
implementation; and the Bulletproofs construction. This comparison extends
the work by Canard et al [16] to include Bulletproofs’s performance.
Compared to other proposals in the literature, we found that for very big
intervals, the best strategy is to use the square decomposition, as for example
occurs in the construction by Boudot [9], since verification doesn’t depend on
the size of the secret. However, it is important to remark that finding the
decomposition into squares consumes a reasonable amount of computational
resources, what makes the Prover’s algorithm somewhat inefficient. On the
other hand, for small secrets, Schoenmakers’s strategy [50] is the most efficient
scheme with respect to the Prove algorithm.
Although we implemented the scheme described in Section 4.1, namely
Boudot’s proposal [9], we have that its performance is very similar when com-
pared to Lipmaa’s [35] and Groth’s [29] constructions.
26
Figure 1: Proofs size
Figure 2: Prover complexity
In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we represent in the horizontal axis the bit-length of b,
where b is the largest element from the subjacent range [a, b] used for the zero
knowledge range proof scheme.
It is possible to conclude that in general Bulletproofs offers the best perfor-
mance, but depending on the requirements of the underlying chosen use case,
it may be possible that other strategies offer better advantages. For DLT ap-
plications we have that the proof size and the verifier’s complexity are more
important metrics than the prover’s complexity, what means that indeed Bul-
letproofs seems to be the best approach to implement a ZKRP protocol.
7 Related work and final remarks
In this document we described in detail the construction of ZKRP and ZKSM
protocols, which were implemented over Go-Ethereum library. Another way
to obtain Zero Knowledge Set Membership protocols is by using cryptographic
accumulators [13, 12, 2]. Also, the underlying digital signature scheme used,
namely Boneh-Boyen signatures, can be replaced and the construction presented
here can be adapted to use the digital signature proposed by Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [14]. Nevertheless, both modifications would make it necessary to
assume hardness of the strong RSA assumption.
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Figure 3: Verifier complexity
In the context of DLT applications, it is possible to use Zero Knowledge
Set Membership to validate user information without revealing it. A possible
scenario is to perform KYC operations. For example, it would be possible to
validate that the country of residence of a user is one belonging to the European
Union, without revealing which country. In the case of Zero Knowledge Range
Proofs, a commonly mentioned application is validating that someone is over
18 and thus is allowed to use a certain service, without revealing the age. In
Section 1 we discussed several other applications, like reputation systems and
AML or CRS compliance.
Recent breakthroughs in cryptography permit us to construct new protocols
and achieve privacy on demand. These new cryptographic algorithms can be
ultimately considered as tools that can be reused in different problems. There-
fore ING is following the steps to build the knowledge that is necessary in order
to construct a toolbox to deal with the above-mentioned complex problems.
As a future work, we will integrate this implementation to Ethereum, such
that ZKSM can be used in a smart contract. In order to do that, it would be
interesting to rewrite the Verify algorithm in Solidity, avoiding the necessity
of using our modified Go-Ethereum client. Also, we will research other ZKP
protocols that may be used to enhance privacy on DLT and blockchain.
Finally, an important research topic is the construction of post-quantum zero
knowledge proofs. Recently, Benoˆıt Libert et al [34] proposed a construction of
ZKRP based on lattices. However, the proof size is 3.54 MB for secret whose
size is 21000. Although the secret is huge, the size of the proof can’t be made
considerably smaller when the secrets is smaller. Hence, optimizing this con-
struction would allow to reduce the gap existing between conventional schemes
and quantum-resistant ones.
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